Pursuant to Md. Code (1984, 2014 Repl. Vol., 2015 Suppl.), § 10-222(h)(3) of the State Government Article (“SG”), we may only reverse or modify the decision of an administrative agency if that decision is:
(i) unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
SG § 10-222(h)(3). “‘On appellate review of the decision of an administrative agency, this Court reviews the agency’s decision, not the circuit court’s decision.’” Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Prigel Family Creamery, 206 Md. App. 264, 273 (2012) (quoting Halici v. City of Gaithersburg, 180 Md. App. 238, 248 (2008)); Ware v. People’s Counsel for Balt. Cnty., 223 Md. App. 669, 680 (2015) (“In an appeal from a judgment entered on judicial review of a final agency decision, we look ‘through’ the decision of the circuit court to review the agency decision itself.”). Moreover,
“Our review of the agency’s factual findings entails only an appraisal and evaluation of the agency’s fact finding and not an independent decision on the evidence. This
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In this case, Brunner failed to persuade the ALJ that her disability was the natural and proximate result of her fall on December 10, 2003. The ALJ was free to find Draper’s opinions more credible than Fanchetti’s “conclusory” assessment. Draper’s testimony that Brunner’s disability was the result of preexisting degenerative disc disease constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding. Moreover, Draper’s testimony was supported by medical records originating before the alleged fall. Indeed, the RPS’s evidence, if believed, was more than sufficient to refute Brunner’s claim that her disability was the natural and proximate result of her fall on December 10,
Did the circuit court err in finding ratifying the foreclosure sale pursuant to Md. Rule 14-305.
Holding: (What rule, definition or standard did the court use to resolve the dispute?) Kirkpatricks ' complaint against Transamerica Insurance Company adequately states a cause of action, in which the court reversed the lower courts decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the appellate courts
The Supreme Court found, after analysis of the case, that they did in fact commit an error. The main issue was the misinterpretation of the Daubert/Wilt standard by the trial court. The significance of the Daubert/Wilt standard is to provide a framework for determining the reliability of expert testimony. The court using the Daubert/Wilt standard checks to determine whether the expert used a methodology recognized by the scientific community for rendering their expert opinion and whether this methodology was correctly applied. If it was and the scientific expert is deemed qualified then the testimony is considered reliable and can be used at trial.
However, one must consider the egg shell skull rule which states the defendant must “take his plaintiff as he finds him.” What if attributable to her disease process she fell to her death while on
Nabozny v. Podlesny (1996) was a case heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit regarding the protection of a school student in Ashland, Wisconsin, who had been harassed and bullied by classmates because of his sexual orientation. The plaintiff in the case—Jamie Nabozny—sought damages from school officials for their failure to protect him from the bullying. A jury found that this failure violated Nabozny's constitutional rights and awarded him $962,000 in damages.[1][2] Contents [hide] 1 Background 2 The case 3 Reception and significance 4 References 5 External links Background[edit] Jamie Nabozny (born October 1975) went to the local public middle school in the small Wisconsin town of Ashland, where his parents
The state appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which supported the ruling of the appeals
In Roper v. Simmons there are two issues that must be addressed, the first being the issue of moral maturity and culpability. The defense in the trial phase of this case argued that Mr. Simmons was an at an age where he was not responsible enough to fully understand the effects and consequences of his actions. The majority draws on Atkins v. Virginia to argue that this specific precedent supports their case that the death penalty should not be imposed on the mentally immature or impaired. However, an important point to be made is that the Atkins v. Virginia decision is geared towards the clinical definition of mental retardation: significant limitations that limit adaptive skills. Also, another important question to consider is the competency and premeditation of Mr. Simmons’ crime in this case.
Title and Citation: Drope v. Missouri, 42 U.S. 162 (1975) Type of Action: Competency to Stand Trial Facts of the Case: In 1969, petitioner was indicted with two others for rape of petitioner’s wife. Following these allegations, the petitioner filed a motion for a continuance so that he might be further examined and receive psychiatric treatment. Although, that motion was denied and the case proceeded with trial. The petitioner’s wife testified, repeated, and confirmed that the petitioner had been acting very strange lately and she changed her mind several times before coming to the trial about whether or not to testify because the petitioner tried to kill her the Sunday prior to trial.
Bearman v. Notre Dame 453 N.E. 2d 1196 (Ind Ct App 1983) Facts: The plaintiff Christenna Bearman and her husband sued the University of Notre Dame for the damages that resulted from an injury occurring on October 27th, 1979. Mrs. Bearman’s leg was broken when an intoxicated person after walking away from fighting with another intoxicated man fell into her from behind, knocking her down as she was returning to her car after a Notre Dame football game. During the incident there was no security or ushers in the area. Mrs. Bareman argued that she was a business invitee and there was a sense of duty of care that the university should have had for her.
All witnesses for the defence stated that the appellant’s skates did not leave the ice. In regards to skating past the opposing bench, the appellant testified that he only meant that injuries happen in sports, hence why we brought up the tripping incident
It confirms the already assumed. During the court trial, Dr. Jones was asked “From your conversations and examination of Perry Edward Smith, do you have an opinion as to whether he knew right from wrong at the time of the offense involved in this action?” (296). The doctor replies with a simple no. I strongly disagree what the doctor decides to reply. He claims he has no opinion because of Perry having no opinion.
Under the modified Daubert standard, relevant scientific evidence is only admissible if it is centered upon testable hypotheses, conforms with the standard rate of potential errors, has been peer reviewed, and if the method is generally accepted in the scientific community (Hoog, 2008). However, there are three problems with the application of the Daubert standard. Firstly, David E. Bernstein and Jeffrey D. Jackson (2004) proved that there was no uniformity in the application of the standard in the sense that it’s only abided with in a portion of the states, and not necessarily with full adherence. Secondly, since the judge is not a scientist, it is difficult for him/her to, without doubt, determine the full honesty of the experts’ testimonies. An example from the Willingham case would be the two medical experts asserting that he was a sociopath although one was an irrelevant family counselor and the other, known as “Dr. Death” and later expelled from the American Psychiatric Association for ethical violations, had not even spoken to Todd Willingham.
At the end of this case, the court had this to