The Army’s ability to plan, prepare, and execute operations anywhere in the world is derived from decisions that Mission Command makes. “Mission Command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.” (ADP 6-0. 2019) Without command and control, there would be no operations that could exist. Even though Operation Anaconda was considered a successful operation, it lacked multiple elements that are driven from mission command. Elements like competence from adjacent coalition forces, shared understanding not only from an intelligence aspect but also from supporting Task Forces, and risk acceptance which left behind crucial equipment that was deemed …show more content…
Competence is the ability to achieve a successful performance through knowledge and skill. There needs to be competence in understanding a task that is given to succeed. With Operation Anaconda, there were a variety of scenarios that lacked competence which impeded progress for the operation. One of the first examples comes from the issue that 10th Mountain needed personnel to plus up the number of people participating in the operation. Since the unit got new people, the new soldiers were not accustomed to the standard operating procedures that 10th Mountain had in place. Through this, new leaders and soldiers were not as competent as those of soldiers that were a part of the organization for some time. This effected the higher levels of command from getting new leaders added to the staff to assist with making calculated analysis and help form possible solutions. Also, it impacted lower levels of soldiers at a team, squad, and platoon level because extra care and training was needed to teach the new recruits the ways in which their team fought. Competence was also …show more content…
When a clear picture is not presented, it creates challenges for staff members to hopefully overcome to help support a decision. The first issue this operation had for shared understanding was that the operation had several people in charge at the same level. Usually in operations you have one hierarchy and lower levels of leaders underneath that hierarchy. For instance, the militia forces were under the control of Zia Lodin. Zia worked with the U.S. armed forces, but the U.S. Army was not in charge of them. So, when Zia ordered his militia to retreat, he had every right to and was not disobeying an order. Another occurrence was that the Coalition Forces Air Component Command did not answer to the Land Component Command. This led to aircraft not being supported in a way that the Land Component Commander needed. Shared understanding is also conducted through intelligence. The information of what enemy forces were on and around the objective was different than what the coalition task force engaged with. This directed the coalition forces to leave behind equipment that they thought was not necessary for the operation due to the lessen amount of enemy anticipated on the objective. Without a shared understanding through all planes of a task force, decision points were made, and events took place that incumbered Operation
On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective
Proof #2: Lack of Command Structure and Communications This section will examine how lack of command structure and communications directly attributed to the failure of OPERATION SPRING. This will be achieved through the explanation of the German reinforcement of the St. Martin Road leading to the intended Canadian assembly area of St. Martin, and how the fierce resistance on this road would lead not only to a delay in the intended assault time, but also the killing of the two highest ranking officers of the regiment prior to the
This battle, which lasted for two weeks and involved US and Afghan forces engaging with members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, is seen as a turning point in the war, with the US-led coalition ultimately driving the enemy forces out of the valley (Kugler, 2007). The battle was significant in that it demonstrated the effectiveness of US-led coalition forces in a mountainous terrain and against a determined enemy. The coalition forces employed air strikes and ground troops to drive out the enemy, and the success of this strategy was evident in the outcome of the battle. Furthermore, Operation Anaconda demonstrated the importance of collaboration between US and Afghan forces, with the latter playing an important role in the battle. The battle also highlighted the need for US and Afghan forces to carefully consider the terrain and environment when engaging with the enemy.
Air Forces, initially seen as something other than an essential part of the operation. General Franks and General Mikolashek needed competence in their subordinate commander General Hagenbeck to give him the leverage he needed to make command decisions. Therefore, the military forces must devise a new plan without veering from the commander's intent. This new plan consisted of massive air strikes to support U.S. Army forces in the valley. Having a shared understanding as defined in ADP 6-0 (2019) paragraph 1-38, commanders and staffs actively create shared understanding throughout operations (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment).
Operation Eagle Claw The purpose of this paper is to outline the events of Operation Eagle Claw, the mistakes made, lessons learned, and additional outcomes. Operation Eagle Claw was essentially doomed from the beginning. President Jimmy Carter hastily authorized a Joint forces operation which inevitably failed due to lack of understanding and training between the forces. There was no single point of failure for the mission; it was across the board, from training to planning, intelligence collection, and time.
Leadership failure was primarily because the forces had never worked together before. Therefore, they did not communicate between with each other to exchange information and
Therefore, he dispatched his 2nd Brigade Commander, Colonel Anderson, to gather as much information as possible, assess the situation, then report back describing the conditions in order for Major General Petraeus to lead, and direct his units in Mosul. This paper explores the aspects he used to lead, direct, and assess the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul. Moreover, how General Petraeus was able to utilize artful
Introduction: Operation Anaconda was one of the largest operations conducted by the United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan in March 2002. The operation was aimed at destroying Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in eastern Afghanistan. The success of the operation was due in part to the principles of mission command, which allowed individual soldiers like M.Sgt. John Chapman to demonstrate their leadership and bravery on the battlefield. This analytical essay will examine the seven army principles of mission command and how they were demonstrated in the story of M.Sgt.
General Petraeus and his Leadership Approach to Mosul A Leaders Restoration of a Nation Following the invasion of Coalition Forces into Iraq in March of 2003 the Army’s 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General David Petraeus, found itself in the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul (Lundberg, 2008). With the invasion complete and capturing of the capitol city of Baghdad accomplished, Major General Petraeus and staff began confronting the issues and concerns of what lay ahead for the duration of the unit’s deployment (Lundberg, 2008). The development and implementation of Major General David Petraeus’ strategy to bring stability to Mosul, Iraq and surrounding areas following the 2003 invasion provides insight into his leadership approach
Colonel Paul Freeman commanded the 23rd Regimental Combat Team to victory at the Battle of Chipyong-ni, marking the first major victory by the United States Army over the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in the Korean War. This is an account of his heroism and supporting his brothers-in-arms. Colonel Freeman was able to demonstrate mission command through action. He used the following four mission command principles: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create a shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, and accept the prudent risk. Colonel Freeman was able to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, by utilizing engaged leadership, previous combat experiences, and promoting a positive command environment.
(U.S. Army, 2020) For military intelligence this could be synchronization of internal personnel to accomplish a mission set or leveraging outside personnel, units, or agencies to enhance an operation. Failure to coordinate could lead to intelligence Soldiers not being able to complete their assigned portion of the mission. Thus, causing intelligence gaps from a lack of collection and not providing a complete picture of the battlespace for the commander to make accurate decisions. Much like Soldiers not being proficient in individual tasks leads to failure of collective tasks; poor intelligence leads to poor mission planning and
General Patton drove the Allied forces since he had already built the cohesive team through mutual trust. General Patton also created a shared understanding throughout all of his troops of the mission they had to accomplish. General Patton also was highly known throughout the war for always giving a clear commander’s intent and did so again in the Battle of the Bulge. General Patton also used mission orders to ensure that his subordinate units completed the strategic objective of the operation and didn’t worry about micromanaging their Soldiers. General Patton helped put the
By definition, “mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations,” according to ADRP 5-0. Mission command is about knowing when to change the task to fit the purpose. This paper is intended to analyze the mission command of one side of the battle, focusing on the commander’s role in the operations process. The Battle of Bunker Hill was the most important battle of the American Revolution because of Colonel Prescott’s superior command and control.
Joint Planning for Operation Anaconda SFC Spurlock, Matthew MLC Class 005-18 Joint Planning for Operation Anaconda Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, there have been numerous battles. One of the most important battles that shaped future joint planning of operations was Operation Anaconda. The outcome of this operation was ultimately successful, however, the original intent from the commanders were not met due to errors in the joint planning process. Joint planning during Operation Anaconda proved ineffective because of inaccurate intelligence about the terrain and weather, the exemption of Air Force and Navy during the initial planning phase, and false assumptions about the enemy. Intelligence Intelligence Preparation
The U.S. Army demands that all its members be accountable for their actions, equipment, records, duties and even for their fellow warriors. Planning for operations, especially during times of war, stresses the importance of