Marine Air-Ground Task Force Analysis

The U.S. Marine Corps has been fighting the nation’s conflicts since their founding in 1775. Their agile structure and unique capabilities make them the primary go to force for military operations and activities. Marines have currently and/or have been previously involved in several joint operational environments from stability operations in Haiti with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), to peace operations in Liberia with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism operations in the Philippines with Operation Freedom Eagle. These military operations and activities are different in scope, nature, and presumed

I am writing this to explain the circumstances that resulted in the recent moves, and the frequency of those moves, of me and my family. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that those moves are abnormal to the Army and should not be used as a basis for determining future moves. In 2004, the Army instituted the Force Stabilization Initiative in order to increase readiness and stability for the fighting force, and predictability for their families. This initiative outlined stability for first term Soldiers at approximately six years and second or third term Soldiers at approximately three years.

The CJCS also outlines and writes the National Military Strategy provided to Combatant Commanders as military context and translation of the National Defense

The application of maneuver warfare has been the key to success in many battles throughout history, however the resurrection of irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan has reshaped military tactics and engagement criteria. Although the U.S. Marine Corps is a highly trained and adaptable fighting force, the current doctrine for maneuver warfare is insufficient to combat irregular warfare on the battlefronts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Wartime training programs for the Marine Corps largely stayed the same for decades before GWOT, which included combined arms exercises (CAX) and live fire exercises, but many revisions to policy and doctrine would transpire for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. CAX would be revised in 2004 to include patrolling and live fire exercises in an urban area environment. (Schlosser, 2015, p. 81-82)

Strategic Studies Quarterly. , Spring. 2015, pp. 86–97. EBSCO, http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-09_Issue-1/tallis.pdf.

The most important phase is pre-launch whereby the right stewards are selected to sell the story, creating the start for cultural change. This Task Force should be charged with developing the recommendation outlined above into actual policy language that can be presented to the Secretary of Defense. The main objective for the Task Force is changing the fraternization policy, considering the second and third order effects of reenergizing the “profession”, eliminating dual-military personal relationships, enhancing mutual respect amongst the force, developing professional only relationships within the force, reducing sexual harassment, and eliminating sexual assault. The policy should also be evaluated so that it is simplistic for ease in interpretation and

The Army’s global operational requirements have generated an increased demand for Reserve Component forces availability, readiness, and utilization. However, the current pre-mobilization training model does not conform to the new requirements; thus, creating a training gap and hindering the ability to generate the necessary readiness. This paper will examine the historical context and will elaborate on the current Army dilemma of needing, generating, and maintaining an Operational Reserve while providing recommendations for an updated pre-mobilization training model to sustain such capability. Recommendations to increase the statutory available training days, for certain operational units, based on collective training readiness and operational

The Army Operating Concept (AOC) describes how the Army employs forces against increasingly capable opponents to accomplish campaign objectives. The AOC can be divided into the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC), which provide an analytical framework for approaching the warfighting functions and focuses the Army when developing the future force. Challenge sixteen of the AWFC, in particular, addresses the Army’s capabilities within a theatre including providing strategic agility and maintaining freedom of movement. In regards to the former, future forces are expected to be able to provide strategic agility when setting a theatre in order to provide a stable operating environment.

Acknowledging that the Army’s future will be complex and uncertain, given the instability in nearly every combatant command ,Gen. Odierno, expresses concern that sequestration, will not only add to an already complex and challenging world but will significantly degrade military effectiveness. As the government works to reduce the deficit sequestration, has caused a significant effect on military capabilities. A resourcing shortfall that outlined in by Gen. Odierno that will impact operational units is: training at Combat Training Centers (CTC). Highlighted in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Odierno, notes that only one-third of combat brigades are ready fight.

Nesting the Mission & Vision The ability for the Marine Corps to accomplish its mission is predicated on subordinate organizations (commands) establishing and executing a mission that syncs with the greater whole. An implied task from the above Marine Corps mission statement, is to take young civilians from innumerable cultural and education backgrounds and develop them into a person of character that is capable of demonstrating initiative and rational thought in the most stressful situation known to man - War. In addition to providing basic level job skills to entry-level Marines, our organization must enhance the personal development of these future warfighters who will be called upon to make difficult decisions in extreme situations. Critical

With this in mind, small units of international police forces or local national Army units who US Soldiers would be expected to partner with were brought to the combat training centers in the United States and Europe so that US units could begin to develop a working relationship and develop an effective multicultural team. As the US units would be the actual unit in charge of operations during the actual combat deployment, it was necessary to assess and properly train these international forces to a basic level that would be necessary to exercise mission command over them. This training proved to be very beneficial as Soldiers were given the opportunity to lead and manage foreign Soldiers, thereby creating a cultural understanding that served to strengthen the alliance between these nations and develop a common operating

07/2015 JOINT LEADERSHIP COURSE Individual Graded Essay The advantages of joint warfare are best optimised by creating “one joint service” rather than integrating different services. Discuss. ( 1098 words)

It integrated inputs from Predator, RC-135, U-2, E-8, and other sensors around the clock. Leadership at higher levels often overshadowed the command and control capabilities of on-scene leadership. “Reduced to basics, the sensor-to-shooter cycle entailed finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, deciding, engaging, and assessing the results. Unlike Desert Storm, in OEF each of these functions required steadily less time, with the singular exception of deciding. That function grew substantially because of the nature of the war itself and of the target-approval process modern C4/ISR enabled.

Joint Operations. The fact that Seventy Five percent of the world’s population live in littoral and Eighty percent of world’s capital cities and nearly all centres of international trade and economic power are located on coast indicates that future warfare will be predominantly waged in the littorals. Hence, Joint Operations are the way forward, especially considering the shrinking resources. Synergy of resources and efforts along with joint planning will be game changing factor in such scenarios.

Being a foreign officer in the US Army environment, I was aware of the fact that this year at the US Army War College can be very beneficial for my personal and professional development. Despite my previous experience of working at the strategic level in Croatian Armed Forces and in NATO, this is a good opportunity to gain additional knowledge, and to further improve my skills and critical thinking, which will help me in my future career. Not less important for me is to establish good and strong relationship with other students and faculty members. Working at the strategic level in a relatively small armed forces is demanding and requires a lot of additional effort in order to accomplish given tasks. Strategic environment in each country is complex, ambiguous, and demanding, but also different from each country, with its own specifics, requirements, and solutions.